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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : Case No. 19588 
FRANCES BERENICE SCHREUDER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
POINT I 
AT TRIAL, NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED TO 
CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY THAT APPELLANT 
ORDERED HER SON TO MURDER HER FATHER. 
The evidence introduced at trial, at best, corroborates 
several uncharged allegations rather than the offense appellant 
was charged with committing. Both parties agree that Marc 
Schreuder, being the actual killer of Franklin Bradshaw, is an 
accomplice. (See respondent's brief at p. 29.) However, respon-
dent's analysis of the criminal liability of Richard Behrens 
completely disregards the ruling of the trial court. Futhermore, 
the testimony of Vittorio Gentile and Miles Manning does nothing 
to establish that the appellant aided, encouraged, solicited, 
requested or encouraged Marc Schreuder to kill Franklin Brad-
shaw. 
Respondent argues, in its brief, that Richard Behrens 
was not an accomplice. However, the trial court had ruled 
otherwise when discussing appellant's motion to dismiss. At 
that time, the court stated: 
I think Mr. Behrens was an accomplice, it 
appears. [sic] He encouraged, aided, 
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abetted, although the killing and death of 
Franklin Bradshawf although he was not 
directly connected with the place or where, 
[sic] he is an aider and abettor... (R. 
2554) ; 
Prior to thatf the court had ruled that the testimony of Miles 
Manning and Vittorio Gentile corroborated the testimony of Marc 
Schreuder and neither of those two were accomplices. (R. 
2553) 
With respect to Behrens it is obvious he was an 
accomplice based on his testimony that he made attempts to locate 
a qun for appellant and Marc Schreuder for the purpose of killing 
Franklin Bradshaw. The gun was to be used for the purpose of 
killing Franklin Bradshaw. (R. 1993) The last reguest by Marc 
Schreuder for Behren's to obtain a gun was within a month or 
month and one-half of the actual homicide. (R. 1993) Behrens 
made attempts to locate a gun by talking to certain persons in 
New York City about the availability of firearms. (R. 1992) 
Later, Behrens received the murder weapon (R. 1994) and concealed 
it in his apartment for approximately sixteen months before 
giving it to appellant's sister, Marilyn Reagan. (R. 2016) 
This was done after appellant refused to repay him some $3,700 
which was missing from a joint checking account. (R. 2009-2016) 
Behrens aided Marc Schreuder with the reguisite intent to be 
considered an accomplice. Consequently, Behrens is an accomplice 
in the murder of Franklin Bradshaw and his testimony cannot be 
used to corroborate the testimony of Marc Schreuder. 
In State v. Clark, 3 Ut.2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1959), 
the defendant was charged with the offense of abortion by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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instrument. The woman who had an abortion testified and the 
only corroborative evidence of that testimony introduced at 
trial was abortion inducing medications found in the defendants 
possession. This court found that evidence to be insufficient 
to corroborate the offense of abortion by instrument. In the 
instant case, appellant was charged with the murder of her 
father. In its answer to appellant's motion for a bill of 
particulars, the state specified that the homicide was committed 
by Marc Schreuder who was aided, encouraged, solicited or re-
guested by appellant. (R. 212) The testimony of Miles Manning 
and Vittorio Gentile does not corroborate this charge. 
At best, these two witnesses corroborate unrelated 
attempts or conspiricies. However, there were no allegations of 
a conspiracy to commit a homicide, nor were charges of attempted 
homicide alleged in the Information. (R. 44) Manning testified 
that he was introduced to appellant by Richard Behrens in 1977. 
(R. 2132-2134) He claimed that he later received $5,000 from 
appellant to kill a man that she eventually identified as her 
father. (R. 2138-2140) Manning stated that he did nothinq to 
carry out the murder, but stayed three days at the YMCA then 
lied to appellant, claiming he was arrested in Salt Lake City. 
(R. 2140-2143) This evidence does not corroborate Marc Schreuder's 
crucial testimony that he, Marc, killed his grandfather at his 
mother's insistance and instigation. As in State v. Clark, 
supra, this testimony establishes a different offense and does 
nothing more than cast a suspicion on appellant by implicating 
her in an attempt, by means of another instrumentality (Miles 
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Manning rather than Marc Schreuder), to cause the death of her 
father. 
The testimony of Vittorio Gentile also involved an-
other uncharged allegationf and did nothing to establish that 
appellant ordered her son to kill her father. Gentile described 
an incident that occurred in the sprinq of 1978, when he was 
having lunch with the appellant: 
0: [by Mr. Jones] Was there any discussion 
at that lunch about her father, Franklin 
Bradshaw? 
A. There was only one discussion after we 
finish [sic] lunch that was talked about. 
Something she mentioned, something one thing 
[sic] to put a contract on her father. 
0. Mr. Gentile, do you recall how that 
statement came about or how— 
A. No, it was iust out of the blue sky. 
(R. 1836) 
The only thing that this testimony corroborated was a statement 
by Marc Schreuder that in February or March of 1978 his mother 
called him and stated she had hired a hit man from out of state 
to kill her father. (R. 1763-1764) This, like the testimony 
of Miles Manning, does not tend to establish that appellant 
requested or ordered her son, Marc, to kill her father. Once 
again, it corroborates an uncharged allegation which under the 
rule set forth in State v. Clark, supra, is not sufficient to 
corroborate the crucial testimony of Marc Schreuder that he was 
acting at the direction of his mother when he killed his grand-
father. 
In conclusion, this court's ruling in State v. Clark, 
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supra, requires that corroborative evidence tend to establish 
the offense charged. Further, evidence of related but uncharged 
allegations is insufficient corroboration. In this case there 
is nothing to corroborate the testimony of Marc Schreuder 
that he killed Franklin Bradshaw at the instigation and insis-
tence of his mother. Nor does it establish that appellant 
aided, abetted, encouraged, directed, solicited or requested 
Marc Schreuder in causing the death of Franklin Bradshaw. At 
best, the evidence offered as corroboration of Marc Schreuder's 
testimony would tend to prove uncharged allegations of attempted 
homicide or conspiracy to commit homicide. Consequently, ap-
pellant's conviction must be reversed and the charge of criminal 
homicide must be ordered to be dismissed. 
POINT II 
A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT TESTIMONY 
OF AN ACCOMPLICE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE 
SAME AS ANY OTHER WITNESS. 
Respondent gives no argument in its brief supporting 
or justifying the instruction to the jury directing the jury to 
weigh the testimony of an accomplice the same as any other 
witness. (See instruction No. 33 (R. 818)) The policy estab-
lished in the case law regarding the tesitmony of accomplices 
as described in appellant's brief and the problems in assessing 
that credibility likewise is unchallenged by the state. The 
error and prejudicial nature of that error are established in 
appellant's brief and need not be reiterated here. 
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B 
A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF 
ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY WAS MANDATORY IN THIS 
CASE. 
Respondent, in its brief, argues that the failure to 
give the cautionary portion of an instruction on the testimony 
of witnesses who were accomplices was not error for three basic 
reasons: First, because the instruction went far enough in 
describing how to weight the witnesses' credibility. Secondly, 
the instruction misstated the facts of the case and the law. 
Finally, there was no showing of the prerequisites for the 
instruction: that the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated 
or that the testimony was either contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. 
The instruction which was given stated that Marc 
Schreuder, Miles Manning and Richard Behrens all received 
certain promises for their testimony and this could be taken 
into consideration in weighing the credibility of these witness-
es. (R. 803) Such an instruction does nothing more than state 
the obvious. As noted in appellant's brief (pp. 22-23) two of 
the witnesses (Behrens and Marc Schreuder) were accomplices and 
the instruction did not go far enough in informing the jury of 
the problems with accomplice testimony. State v. Chang, 374 
P.2d 5 (Haw. 1962) . 
As for the issue of the instruction misstating the 
facts of the case, appellant raised only the issue of the 
failure of the trial court to give the cautionary sentence of 
the instruction. The trial court did not hesitate to change 
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the factual statement of that instruction and appellant does 
not question those chanqes. Since the instruction was modified 
to correctly state the facts and was qiven in partf this 
arqument carries no weiqht. 
As for the contention that the cautionary instruction 
did not meet the requirements of Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-7 
(1953 as amended) a close analysis of the statute is required. 
That statute provides: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the un-
corroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court
 f an 
instruction to the jury may be qiven to the 
effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an 
instruction shall be qiven if the trial 
judqe finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. [Emphasis added] 
As can be seen from the construction of the statute a cautionary 
instruction is discretionary if the accomplice testimony is 
uncorroborated. See also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 
1981), where this court found that a confession by the defendant 
was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice testimony. However, 
in this case the accomplice testimony was not corroborated. 
See Point I, supra, and Point I of appellant's brief (p. 8-18) 
Under the statute, a cautionary instruction is manda-
tory if the accomplice testimony is contradictory, uncertain or 
improbable. There are many contradictions and uncertainties in 
the testimony of these witnesses. Furthermore, the circumstances 
of the case demonstrate the improbability in the evidence. The 
fact that Marc Schreuder failed to fully reveal the promises 
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given to him by the state is a prime example of the uncertainties 
of his testimony. (See Point VI of appellant's brief.) Marc 
Schreuder had not previously testified but had sat through his 
own preliminary hearing and trial where both Manning and Behrens 
testified. Consequently, there is an unsurprising lack of 
contradiction in his testimony with respect to the other 
witnesses. 
Behren's testimony and statements were replete with 
contradictions. In various prior statements, he gave at least 
three versions of how he received the firearm used in the 
homicide: (1) he received it from the appellant (R. 1995); (2) 
he received it from Marc Schreuder (R. 2022); and (3) that 
Marilyn Reagan had the gun all of the time (R. 2025-2026). 
Behrens also testified that it would not be fair to describe 
his contacts with the appllant in the fall of 1977 as occasional, 
this directly contradicted his testimony at Marc Schreuder's 
trial. (R. 2043-2044) Behrens further testified that he 
introduced Miles Manning to the appellant in front of the 
apartment house where he lived. (R. 2089) Manning initially 
told police that his first meeting with the appellant was at 
her apartment. (R. 2157) With the passing of time Manning's 
memory improved so his description of this initial meeting was 
identical to Behren's testimony and thus "corroborative" testi-
mony. (R. 2134) Interestingly, Manning did not remember 
Behren's name until it was given to him by Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office investigators. (R. 2176) Furthermore, prior to 
taping his initial statement, Manning spoke to investigators 
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for a full hour. (R. 2150) In this same regard, Marc Schreuder 
testified that he was taken out of the prison by Sargeant Mike 
George, of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, on several 
occasions. (R. 1870) He was allowed to visit with his father, 
Vitterio Gentile, at a hotel room. (R. 1871) He also met with 
Ernie Jones, the prosecutor on the case, on several occasions 
at the Salt Lake County Attorney's office. (R. 1875) Further-
more, George took Marc Schreuder out of the prison to see the 
movies with his girlfriend (R. 1872) and to go to the University 
to be inducted into an honors society. (R. 1872-3) Sargeant 
George was the investigator assigned to the appellant's case. 
(R. 2451-2452) 
These inconsistencies and changes in the witnesses' 
testimony in themselves merit a cautionary instruction. When 
the changes in testimony are considered in conjunction with the 
actions of the state's investigators in the case in allowing 
the witnesses to meet, and in all likelihood, discuss their 
testimony and with the additional favors provided to Marc 
Schreuder, a cautionary instruction was mandated. This is 
because the improbability of the testimony is established. 
Under these circumstances, it would have been proper for the 
trial court to give the instruction sua sponte. The prejudicial 
effects of the failure to give this instruction were discussed 
in appellant's brief and need not be rejected (see appellant's 
brief p. 23). 
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POINT III 
i 
A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
BY ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT. 
1 
At trial, the court allowed Dr. Louis Moench to de-
scribe the relationship between Marc Schreuder and appellant as 
it had been related to him by Marc Schreuder. One of the 
effects of this testimony was to allow evidence of bad character, 
in violation of Rule 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Respondent argues that there was no specific objection on the 
basis of character evidence made to this testimony. Secondly, 
respondent argues that such evidence was merely cumulative. 
Respondent relies on Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence in claiming there must be a statement of the specific 
grounds for objection to claim error on appeal. However, under 
that rule, it is sufficient if the grounds for the objection were 
apparent from the context in which they were made. In this 
case an objection was made to testimony about appellant's 
threat of suicide. (R. 1947) From this context, it is obvious 
that in addition to the hearsay guestion, this objection was 
made to evidence of character or bad acts of appellant. Like-
wise, more general objections were made regarding the content 
of the statements related to Dr. Moench by Marc Schreuder. (R. 
1946, 1951) 
Respondent also argues that appellant's rights were not 
substantially affected by Dr. Moench1s testimony because it was 
merely cumulative. The majority of Dr. Moench's testimony is Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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set out in appellant's brief. In essence, Moench describes 
a situation where Marc Schreuder and his brother, Larry, were 
continually being locked out of appellant's apartment, requiring 
them to sleep in stairwells. She would not allow him to have 
friends, would threaten to disown him, would threaten to move 
to Harlem, or live in the gutter. Dr. Moench also described 
how appellant had been seeing a psychiatrist and how, when he 
moved, Marc Schreuder took the psychiatrist's place in counsel-
ing appellant. (R. 1947-1951) 
When Marc Schreuder testified he did not mention the 
majority of the information described to Dr. Moench. With 
respect to being locked out of the home he described one incident 
that he remembered when he was 13 or 14 years old. (R. 1823) 
He also described one incident where his mother struck him. 
Further, he stated that she out pressure on him and "harped" at 
him all of the time. (R. 1823) None of the other incidents 
described by Dr. Moench were related in court by Marc Schreuder. 
Other evidence cited by respondent as making Dr. 
Moench's testimony cummulative included Richard Behrens' state-
ments: "appellant would get upset but it would blow over", 
(R. 1987), she got angry and went into a rage when he demanded 
money from her (R. 2009), finally, he was aware that appellant 
had locked Marc Schreuder out on occasion but he did not know 
of any incident where Marc was locked out for a week at a time. 
(R. 2109) Vittorio Gentile testified that he would have to 
strike or beat appellant on occasion, and that was to bring her 
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out of hysterical convulsions. (R. 1850) Marilyn Reagan, 
appellant's sister, stated there would be times that appellant 
would become hysterical and loose control. (R. 2407) This 
was answered in conjunction with questions about appellant's 
marital problems resulting from physical abuse by Vittorio 
Gentile. With these witnesses, including Marc Schreuderf the 
statements reqarding appellant's character arose from isolated 
questions with each witness. Never was a long involved discus-
sion of appellant's character described by Dr. Moench. The 
effect on the jury from those witnesses could not have near the 
impact that Dr. Moench's testimony had. 
As for the testimony of Steven Kleinf that was given 
over objection by defense counsel. (R. 2437f 2440) That 
evidence did not relate to appellant's relationship with Marc 
Schreuder. Similar to the testimony just described, the effect 
of Klein's testimony was insignificant in relation to Dr. 
Moench's. 
In conclusion, the nature of the evidence from wit-
nesses other than Dr. Moench relating to appellant's character 
was not cumulative. Essentially, the other witnesses described 
appellant's temper. They did not describe the specific incidents 
as related by Dr. Moench. Nor was the majority of the testimony 
given by these witnesses focused on appellant's character. 
Conseguently, the error committed at trial in admitting the 
testimony of Dr. Moench regarding the character of appellant 
was prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment and convic-
tion. 
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B 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE BY APPELLANT TO 
MARC SCHREUDER WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 
401 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires the 
trial court to weigh the probative value of evidence against 
its prejudicial effect to determine if the evidence is admiss-
ible. Respondent argues that the testimony of Dr. Moench was 
probative in that his opinion tended to establish that appellant 
exercised great emotional influence over Marc Schreuder. 
(Respondent's brief at p. 45) In this veinf respondent also 
argues that the hearsay statements from Marc Schreuder to Dr. 
Moench were merely cumulative. This argument has already been 
addressed. (See Point III A, supra) However, even if it did 
merely amount to cumulative evidence its probative effect is 
then substantially diminished. As for the opinion, that evidence 
could be admissible without the hearsay statements being in-
troduced. The prejudicial nature and magnitude of the acts 
described by Dr. Moench far outweigh the probative value of 
such evidence. Conseguently, the hearsay statements by Marc 
Schreuder to Dr. Moench should have been excluded. 
C 
MARC SCHREUDER'S STATEMENTS TO DR. MOENCH 
ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER ANY OF THE EVI-
DENTIARY THEORIES ADVANCED BY RESPONDENT. 
Respondent argues, in its brief, that statements by 
Marc Schreuder to Dr. Moench are admissible under three separate 
theories. First, the state claims that the statements are 
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{ 
admissible because they were relied upon by Dr. Moench in 
making his medical diagnosis, pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. Second, the statements are claimed to 
be admissible as the basis of an expert opinion, pursuant to 
1 
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Finally, the statements 
are claimed admissible as prior consistent statements, pursuant 
to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
With respect to the issue of diagnosis and treatment, 
the court in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 
1980), in dealing with an identical federal rule, held that a 
two prong test for admissibility must be met before such 
statements would be admitted: 
... first is the declarant's motive consis-
tent with the purpose of the rule,m and 
second, is it reasonable for the physician 
to rely on the information in diagnosis or 
treatment. 633 F.2d 77 at 84. 
Thus, this test requires that, before such statements 
are admissible, there must be a showing that the statements 
have some indicia of reliability. Respondent's position, on 
the other hand, seem to be that statements made to a physician 
1. The purpose of the rule had been described earlier in the 
case: 
It focuses upon the patient and relies upon 
the patient's strong motive to tell the 
truth because diagnosis or treatment will 
depend in part upon what the patient says. 
It is thought that the declarant's motive 
guarantees trustworthiness sufficiently to 
allow an exception to the hearsay rule. 
633 F.2d 77 at 83-84. 
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for the purpose of diagnosis should be admissible without making 
any showing of reliability. Appellant submits that the test 
for admissibility as described in Iron Shell, supra , should be 
adopted by this court. Such a rule would prevent situations 
such as occurred in the instant case where virtually anything 
can be said to a physician and these statements could then be 
introduced into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
When the Iron Shell test is applied to the instant 
case, the statements in question become inadmissible. Marc 
Schreuder's motive in providing information to Dr. Moench was 
to provide himself with a defense to the charge of first degree 
murder by placing the blame on his mother. As for the second 
prong, it would not be reasonable to rely on Marc Schreuderfs 
statements as they were made during the course of two interviews, 
each of which lasted only two hours. (R. 1945) Since the 
evidence in question here fails both prongs of the Iron Shell 
test it lacks the reguisite reliability and is inadmissible. 
Respondent's reliance on Rule 703 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence is also misplaced. A reading of the rule shows 
that it merely allows an expert to rely on evidence that has 
not been presented in court. 
Rule 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY 
EXPERTS. 
The facts or data in the particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearinq. If 
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions 
or inferences upon the subject, the facts 
or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
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Analyzing this rule in conjunction with Rule 7052 
reinforces appellant's position, because Rule 705 allows an 
expert to testify without disclosing the underlying facts or 
data upon which he bases his opinion. In Mannino v. Interna-
tional Manufacturing Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1981), the 
trial court had ruled that an expert's opinion was based on 
material not properly gualified as a basis for expert opinion. 
In finding that this ruling was in error, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
The purpose of Rule 703 is to make available 
to the expert all of the kinds of things 
that an expert would normally rely upon in 
forming an opinion, without requiring that 
those be admissible in evidence. Under the 
Rule, the expert is free to give his opinion 
relying on the types of data an expert 
would normally use in forming an opinion in 
his area of expertise. In short, through 
Rule 703, the law is catching up with the 
realities of professional life. 650 F.2d 
at 851. 
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not 
provide a basis for the admissibility of evidence. Conseguently, 
this rule cannot be used as a justification for admitting Marc 
Schreuder's statements to Dr. Moench. 
2. Rule 7 05 provides: 
Rule 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATE 
(SIC) UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion 
or inference and give his reasons therefor 
without prior disclosure of the underlying 
facts or data, unless the court requires 
otherwise. The expert may in any event be 
reguired to disclose the underlying facts 
or data on cross-examination. 
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Finally, respondent relies on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence as a basis' for the admissibility of 
Marc Schreuder's statements to Dr. Moench. That rule provides: 
A statement is not hearsay if...the declar-
ant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is...consis-
tent with his testimony and is offered to 
rebut an express or implied charge against 
him of recent fabrication or improper in-
fluence or motive. 
One commentator has stated, 
A consistent statement at a time prior to 
the existence of a fact said to indicate 
bias, interest, or corruption, will 
effectively explain away the force of the 
impeaching evidence; because it is thus 
made to appear that the statement in the 
form now uttered was independent of the 
discrediting influence. 4 Wigmore, Evid-
ence §1128 at 268 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) 
The appellate courts have interpreted an identical 
federal rule to reguire that the prior consistant statement be 
made at a time prior to the existence of a motive to falsify. 
United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384 (2nd Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Stuart, 718 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Henderson, 717 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1983). 
In this case Dr. Moench was originally retained to 
aid in Marc Schreuder's defense. (R. 927, 868) Marc Schreuder 
made the statements to Dr. Moench to attempt to get a reduction 
in the degree of the offense with which he was charged - from a 
capital offense to a second degree felony. (R. 868) The 
statements to Dr. Moench were made well after the motive to 
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fabricate existed and thus were inadmissible under Rule 801(1) 
(d)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Marc Schreuder's statements to Dr. Moench are not 
admissible under any of the theories advanced by the respondent. 
As described above (see Point III A, supra) the evidence is not 
cumulative. The prejudicial effect of the evidence was described 
in appellant's brief and need not be repeated here. 
J 
'D: 
Appellant submits this point based on the argument 
previously made in her brief on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT1S "DEATH QUALIFICATION" PRO-
CEDURE CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 
SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO AN 
IMPARTIAL AND REPRESENTATIVE JURY. 
Appellant acknowledges State v. Moorey Utah (No. 18737f < 
file 2-1-85) , which was recently decided by this court. In 
Moore , supra , this court ruled that any prejudice created by 
excluding potential jurors who would never impose the death ( 
penalty was off-set by also excluding those who were "automatic 
death-penalty" prone. 
Appellant understands this holding. However, it is < 
appellant's contention, as was argued in her original brief, 
that discussing the issue of "death penalty" at all, creates a 
natural inclination on the part of juries to convict. Appel- ( 
lant has cited in her brief the numerous studies supporting 
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this argument. Thus, appellant respectfully requests this court 
to reconsider this issue in this specific context. 
POINTS V - VIII 
Respondent raises no issues of fact or law not ad-
dressed in appellant's brief. Therefore, appellant submits 
these points based on the arguments presently before the 
court. 
POINT IX 
APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY CITED THE RECORD IN 
HER APPELLATE BRIEF - THEREFORE, THIS APPEAL 
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED. 
In its brief, respondent has correctly pointed out 
that Rule 75 (p)(2)(2)(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires appellant's brief to contain "a concise statement of 
the material facts of the case citing the pages of the record 
supporting such statement". Respondent then cites a number of 
Utah cases in which this court has stated that a failure to 
comply with Rule 75 can be the basis for dismissing an 
appeal. 
However, the instant case differs substantially from 
those cited by respondent. Because of the length of appellant's 
brief and the number of issues involved, counsel intended that 
the initial statement of facts be used merely as an overview of 
the case. 
In State v. Stegqell, 660 P.2d 252 (1983), which was 
cited in respondent's brief, this court noted that the defen-
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dant's brief contained "absolutely no references to the trial 
record or transcript to support his factual allegations" (660 
P.2d at 253). In the instant case, appellant's initial statement 
of facts was intended to qive this court a qeneral idea as to 
the nature of this appeal. 
Upon readinq appellant's brief, the court should note 
that each specific arqument is supported by facts that properly 
recite the trial transcript, which is part of the record on 
appeal. Unlike Steqqell, supra, and the other cases cited by 
respondent, appellant's brief cites the record on numerous 
occasions, in each particular argument. 
If, in the instant case, appellant had recited all of 
the facts and cites to the record in her initial statement of 
facts, such statement would have been unduly lenqthy. Also, 
each of those facts would have been repeated in each of the 
separate arquments, thus creatinq needless repetition. Althouqh 
it is economical to cite the record and all relevant facts 
initially, in a case such as this, it becomes necessary to 
adjust one's approach for the sake of clarity and brevity. 
Appellant has sufficiently cited the record in statinq 
the facts relevant to each argument. Although there has not 
been strict compliance, the length of her brief necessitated a 
slight variance. Therefore, this appeal should not be dismissed 
for the above stated reasons. 
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CONCLUSION 
The relief sought by appellant is to have her judgment 
and conviction for the offense of criminal homicide murder in 
the first degree reversed and the case remanded to the Third 
District Court with an order to either: impose a judgment of 
acquittalf give appellant a new trial, or impose a judgment 
and conviction for the lesser and included offense of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree. 
Dated this J day of Ma#-r--l-$85. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes, Pules of Evidence and Jury Instructions 
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I 
STATUTES 
§77-31-18. Conviction on testimony of accomplice. A convic-
tion shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless 
he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and 
without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to 
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and 
the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows 
the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. 
(Repealed 1980) 
§77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice - Instruction 
to jury. 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of 
an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury 
may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall be 
given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 103 
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is on admitting evidence, 
a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, 
stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground 
was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the 
court by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
guestions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other 
or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, 
the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the 
ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question 
and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmiss-
ible evidence from being suggested to the jury by an means, 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions 
in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice 
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RULES OF EVIDENCE CONTINUED 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of conseguence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
RULE 703 
BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence. 
RULE 705 
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and 
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or dataf unless the court reguires otherwise. 
The expert may in any event be reguired to disclose the underlying 
facts or data on cross examination. 
RULE 801 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended 
by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hear-
say if 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testified 
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent 
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charged against him of recent fabrication or improper influence Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RULES OF EVIDENCE CONTINUED 
Rule 801 (continued) 
or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his 
individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of 
which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, 
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
RULE 8 02 
HEARSAY RULE 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these 
rules. 
RULE 803 
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment 
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of 
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diaanosis or treatment. 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
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INSTRUCTION # 
You are instructed that three witnesses, Marc Schreuder, 
Richard Behrens and Myles Manning have each been granted 
immunity from prosecution for various crimes. You are to 
view their testimony with the utmost scrutiny and caution. 
r
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INSTRUCTION N Q ^ ^ _ 
An "accoipllce" Is a person who knowlnglyf volun-
tarily, and with common In tent , unites In the commission of a 
crime; he is one who could be charged with the commission of 
the crime. 
A conviction may not rest on the testimony of an 
accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which 
in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the of-
fense. 
The testimony of such an accomplice is corroborated 
however, where there is evidence from sources other than 
the accomplice which, when considered together with other 
facts in evidence, tends to show that the crime charged in 
the information was committed and that the defendant was 
implicated and connected with the commission of the crime* 
Such corroborating evidence need not go to all the 
material facts as testified by the accomplice, nor need the 
corroboration be sufficient in itself to support a conviction; 
it may be slight and entitled to little consideration. How-
ever, the corroborating evidence must connect the defendant 
with the commission of the offense and be consistent with her 
guilt and inconsistent with her innocence and must do more 
than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant. 
utH 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
Page 2 
Where the testimony is corroborated by other evidence 
the testimony of an accomplice is entitled to the same 
consideration as you would give to any other witness. The fact 
that a person is an accomplice to a crime is no evidence that 
he is not a credible witness and is no reason for rejecting 
his testimony. However, you should weigh hf^ testimony as 
you would weigh the testimony of any other witness and may 
take into consideration any bias, interest, or any probable 
motive or lack of motive to testify fairly. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. M. 
You are instructed that Marc Schreuder, Richard Behrens 
and Miles Manning have received certain promises from the prosecu-
tor in exchange for their testimony, You may consider this fact 
in weighing the credibility of their testimony. 
V 
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